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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become key components
of many safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving and med-
ical diagnosis. However, DNNs have been shown suffering from poor ro-
bustness because of their susceptibility to adversarial examples such that
small perturbations to an input result in misprediction. Addressing to
this concern, various approaches have been proposed to formally verify
the robustness of DNNs. Most of these approaches reduce the verification
problem to optimization problems of searching an adversarial example
for a given input so that it is not correctly classified to the original label.
However, they are limited in accuracy and scalability. In this paper, we
propose a novel approach that can accelerate the robustness verification
techniques by guiding the verification with target labels. The key insight
of our approach is that the robustness verification problem of DNNs can
be solved by verifying sub-problems of DNNs, one per target label. Fix-
ing the target label during verification can drastically reduce the search
space and thus improve the efficiency. We also propose an approach by
leveraging symbolic interval propagation and linear relaxation techniques
to sort the target labels in terms of chances that adversarial examples ex-
ist. This often allows us to quickly falsify the robustness of DNNs and the
verification for remaining target labels could be avoided. Our approach
is orthogonal to, and can be integrated with, many existing verification
techniques. For evaluation purposes, we integrate it with three recent
promising DNN verification tools, i.e., MipVerify, DeepZ, and Neurify.
Experimental results show that our approach can significantly improve
these tools by 36X speedup when the perturbation distance is set in a
reasonable range.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable performance and ac-
complished unprecedented breakthrough in many complex tasks such as image
classification [27,18] and speech recognition [20]. The progress makes it possi-
ble to apply DNNs to real-world safety-critical domains, e.g., autonomous driv-
ing [21,1,54] and medical diagnostics [10,41,37]. Systems in such domains must
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be highly dependable and hereby their safety should be comprehensively certi-
fied before deployments. One of the most challenging problems in this domain
is that DNNs have been shown suffering from poor robustness. That is, a small
modification to a valid input may cause systems to make completely wrong de-
cisions [47,17,35,30,7,11], which consequently result in serious consequences and
even disasters. For instance, a Tesla car in autopilot mode caused a fatal crash
as it failed to detect a white truck against a bright sky with white clouds [45].
Therefore, it is important and necessary to certify the robustness of DNN-based
systems before deployments by proving that the neural networks can always
make the same prediction for a valid input even if the input is slightly perturbed
within an allowed range due to uncertainties from the environment or adversarial
attacks.
Many efforts have been made to certify the robustness of DNNs using formal
verification techniques [6,26,38,19,12,55,58,16,42,50,13,43,44,52]. The essence of
certifying the robustness is to prove mathematically the absence of adversarial
examples for a DNN within a range of allowable perturbations, which are usu-
ally provided by a valid input and a L-norm distance threshold. There are three
main criteria of evaluating verification approaches: soundness, completeness and
scalability. The first states that if a DNN passes the verification, then there
are no adversarial examples. The second states that every robust DNN should
pass the verification. The last one indicates the scale of DNNs that a verification
method can handle. It is known that the verification problem of DNNs with Rec-
tified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function is NP-complete [26]. This means
that sound and complete verification approaches usually have limited scalabil-
ity. Existing formal verification approaches either have limited scalability and
can only handle small networks [26,32,8,15], or rely on abstraction techniques
that simplify the verification problem for better scalability, but they may pro-
duce false positives [16,42,43] after loosing the completeness property due to the
introduction of abstraction.
Our contribution. In this work, we propose a generic approach that can en-
hance neural network verification techniques by guiding the verification with
target labels —- thus making it more amenable to verification. Our approach
is based on the following key insights. Many existing approaches reduce the
verification problem to some optimization problems of searching an adversarial
example for a given input so that it is not correctly classified to the original la-
bel. We found that by fixing a target label during verification, the search space
could be drastically reduced so that the verification problem with respect to the
target label can be efficiently solved, while the overall verification problem can
be solved by verifying the DNN for all the possible target labels. Specifically,
guided by the target label, we can efficiently compute an adversarial example if
there exists one for the given input and L-norm distance threshold . In this case,
the robustness of the DNN is falsified and the verification for other target labels
can be avoided. Furthermore, rather than choosing target labels randomly, we
propose an algorithmically efficient approach to sort the target labels by lever-
aging the symbolic interval propagation and linear relaxation techniques, so that
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the target labels to which some inputs are misclassified by the DNN with larger
probabilities are processed first. This often allows us to quickly disprove the
robustness of the DNN when the target DNN is not robust.
Our approach is orthogonal to, and can be integrated with, many existing
verification techniques which are leveraged to verify the robustness of DNNs for
target labels. To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach, we
integrate it with three recent promising neural network verification tools, i.e.
MipVerify [50], DeepZ [42], and Neurify [50]. We compare both the verification
result and the time cost for verification of the original tools and the tools in-
tegrated with our approach. Experimental results show that our approach can
help the three tools achieve up to 36X acceleration in time efficiency under rea-
sonable perturbation thresholds. Furthermore, the properties i.e. soundness and
completeness (if satisfied) of the original tools are still preserved.
In summary, this paper makes the following three main contributions:
– A novel, generic approach for accelerating the robustness verification of neu-
ral networks guided by target labels.
– An approach for sorting target labels by leveraging the symbolic interval
propagation and linear relaxation techniques.
– Extensions of three recent promising neural network verification tools with
the proposed approach.
Outline. Section 2 briefly introduces some preliminaries used in this work. Sec-
tion 3 presents our verification approach. Section 4 reports experimental results.
Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 finally concludes the paper and dis-
cusses some future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recap some preliminaries such as feed-forward deep neural
networks, interval analysis, symbolic interval propagation and linear relaxation
that are necessary to understand our approach.
2.1 Feed-Forward Deep Neural Networks
In this work, we consider feed-forward deep neural networks (FNNs). An l-layer
FNN can be considered as a function f : I → O, mapping the set of vectors I
to the set of vectors O. Function f is recursively defined as follows:
x0 = x,
xk+1 = φ(W kxk + bk) for k = 0, ..., l − 1,
f(x) = W lxl + bl.
(1)
where x0 = x ∈ I is the input, W k and bk respectively are the weight matrix
and bias vector of the k-th layer, and φ(·) (e.g., ReLU, sigmoid, tanh etc.) is an
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activation function applied coordinate-wise to the input vector. ReLU, defined
by Relu(x) ≡ max(0, x), is one of the most popular activation functions used in
the modern state-of-the-art DNN architectures [18,22,46]. In this paper we are
focused on FNNs that only take ReLU as the activation function. For a given
input x, the label of x is determined by the function L, defined as,
L(f(x)) = arg max
j
f(x)[j],
where, f(x)[j] denotes the j-th element in the output vector f(x) which is the
confidence that x is classified to the label j. In the case that the last step is not
well defined, namely, there are more than one maximum elements in f(x), we call
that x admits an adversarial example. Hereafter, we assume that the last step
of an FNN is well defined, otherwise it is not robust. By applying the softmax
function to the output f(x), we will get the probabilities of the labels to which
the input x is classified. For this reason, we in what follows may say f(x)[j] is
the probability that the input x is classified to the label j. For simplicity, we also
use the indices j to represent the classification labels. L(f(x)) returns the label
whose corresponding probability is the largest among all the labels. We call it
original label of the input x.
Definition 1 (Robustness of FNNs). Given an FNN f : I → O, an input
x ∈ I, and an Lnorm distance threshold , f is robust w.r.t. x and  if
L(f(x)) = L(f(x′))
for all x′ ∈ I such that Lnorm(x, x′) ≤ .
If there exists some x′ ∈ I such that L(f(x)) 6= L(f(x′)), x′ is called an
adversarial example of x.
Given a target label j such that j 6= L(f(x)), the FNN f is called j-robust
w.r.t. x and , if f(x′)[j] < f(x′)[j′] for all x′ ∈ I such that Lnorm(x, x′) ≤ ,
where j′ denotes the original label L(f(x)) of x.
The next proposition states that the robustness problem of a DNN can be
reduced to the j-robustness problem of the DNN (which up to our knowledge
has never been stated in the literature though straightforward):
Proposition 1. Given an FNN f : I → O, an input x ∈ I, and an Lnorm
distance threshold , suppose J is the set of all the possible labels of f , then:
f is robust w.r.t. x and 
iff
f is j-robust w.r.t. x and , for all j ∈ J \ {L(f(x))}.
In this work, we only consider L∞ norm, that is: for each pair of vectors x, x′
with the same size,
L∞(x, x′) ≡ max{|x[j]− x′[j]| : j is an index of the vector x}.
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2.2 Interval Analysis
Interval analysis is a technique which works on intervals rather than concrete
values, where an interval represents a set of consecutive, concrete values. We
provide some basic terms, concepts, and operations of intervals below.
An interval X is a pair [X,X], where X is the lower bound, and X such
that X ≥ X is the upper bound. The interval [X,X] denotes the set of concrete
values {i ∈ N | X ≤ i ≤ X}.
The basic arithmetic operations between intervals are defined in [34]. In this
paper, we only present the definitions of the addition, difference and scalar mul-
tiplication operations which are sufficient for this work. The key point of these
definitions is that computing with intervals is computing with sets. By definition,
the addition (+) of two intervals X and Y is the set
X + Y = {x+ y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } = [X + Y ,X + Y ].
For example, let X = [0, 2] and Y = [−1, 1]. Then X + Y = [0 + (−1), 2 + 1] =
[−1, 3]. The difference (−) of two intervals X and Y is the set denoted by X−Y ,
which is defined as follows:
X − Y = {x− y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } = [X − Y ,X − Y ].
For instance, let X = [−1, 0] and Y = [1, 2]. Then we have −Y = [-2,-1] and
X−Y = X+(−Y ) = [−3,−1]. The scalar multiplication (·) between an interval
X and a constant c is the set, denoted by c ·X or cX, which is defined as follows:
c ·X = {c× x : x ∈ X} = [c×X, c×X].
For instance, let X = [-1,3] and c = 2. Then, we have c ·X = [−2, 6].
2.3 Symbolic Interval Propagation
To sort target labels for a DNN f : I → O, an input x ∈ I and a distance
threshold , we will propagate the interval from the input layer to the output layer
via interval propagation. However, naively computing the output interval of the
DNN in this way suffers from high errors as it computes extremely loose bounds
due to the dependency problem. In particular, it may get a very conservative
estimation of the output, which is not tight enough to be useful for sorting labels.
Consider a 3-layer DNN given in Figure 1(a), where the weights are associ-
ated to the edges and all elements of the bias vectors are 0. Suppose the input of
the first layer are the intervals [1, 3] and [2, 4]. By performing the scalar multi-
plications and additions over intervals layer-by-layer, we get the output interval
[−5, 7]. This output interval contains the concrete value 5 which is introduced
by overestimation, but is an infeasible value. For instance, −5 can occur only
when the neuron n21 outputs 10 and the neuron n22 outputs 5. To output 10 for
the neuron n21, the neurons n11 and n12 should output 3 and 4 simultaneously.
But, to output 5 for the neuron n22, the neurons n11 and n12 should output 1
and 2 simultaneously. This effect is known as the dependency problem [34].
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[1,3] [2,4]
1 1
2 2
-1 1
[5,11][4,10]
[-5,7]
n11 n12
n21 n22
n3
(a) Naive interval propagation
[1,3] [2,4]
2x+y x+2y
1 1
2 2
-1 1
[5,11][4,10]
[-1,3]
-x+y
x yn11 n12
n21 n22
n3
(b) Symbolic interval propagation
Fig. 1. Naive interval propagation vs. symbolic interval propagation.
Symbolic interval propagation [53] is a technique to minimize overestimation
of outputs by preserving as much dependency information as possible during
propagating the intervals layer-by-layer. A symbolic interval is a pair of linear
expressions [e, e′] such that e and e′ are defined over the input variables.
Let us consider the same example using symbolic interval propagation as
shown in Figure 1(b). Suppose x and y are the input variables of the neurons
n11 and n12. By applying the linear transformation of the first layer, the values
of the neurons n21 and n22 are 2x+y and x+2y respectively. Since x ∈ [1, 3] and
y ∈ [2, 4], we have: 2x + y > 0 and x + 2y > 0. Therefore, the output symbolic
intervals of the neurons n21 and n22 are [2x + y, 2x + y] and [x + 2y, x + 2y]
respectively. By applying the linear transformation of the second layer, the value
of the neuron n3 is −x+y. Thus, the output of the DNN will be [−x+ y,−x+ y].
From x ∈ [1, 3] and y ∈ [2, 4], we can conclude that the output interval of the
DNN is [−1, 3], which is tighter than the interval [−5, 7] produced by directly
performing interval propagation.
This example shows that symbolic interval propagation characterizes how
each neuron computes results in terms of the symbolic intervals and related ac-
tivation functions. As the symbolic intervals keep the inter-dependence between
variables, symbolic interval propagation significantly reduces the overestimation.
2.4 Linear Relaxation
To tackle the non-linear activation function ReLU, we use linear relaxation [58] to
strictly overapproximate the symbolic intervals. Consider an intermediate node
with n = ReLU(X). For each symbolic interval X = (l, u), based on the signs of
l and u (determined by concretizing the symbolic intervals), we consider three
cases as shown in Table 1.
– If (l > 0), then ReLU(x) = x for every x ≥ l. Thus, ReLU(X) is X.
– If (u ≤ 0), then ReLU(x) = 0 for every x ≤ u. Thus, ReLU(X) is [0, 0].
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Table 1. Interval propagation for ReLU.
Activation Function ReLU
Condition Upper Lower
0 < l < u x x
l < 0 < u
a(x− l) ax
w.r.t. ( u
u−l ≤ a ≤ 1) w.r.t. (0 ≤ a ≤ 1)
l < u < 0 0 0
– If (l ≤ 0 ≤ u), then X contains both positive and negative values. The output
cannot be exactly represented by one linear interval and thus relaxation is
required. We adopt the linear relaxation defined in [58]. As shown in Figure 2,
we can set upper bound as a(x − l) with respect to uu−l ≤ a ≤ 1 and lower
bound as ax with respect to 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. We select the value of a to minimize
the overestimation error introduced by the linear relaxation.
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
x
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
y
l u
Activation function
Linear UB
Linear LB
Fig. 2. The linear upper and lower bounds for ReLU when l < 0 < u.
3 Verification Framework
In this section, we first show how to sort target labels by leveraging the symbolic
interval propagation and linear relaxation techniques and then present our target
label guided verification approach.
3.1 Sorting Target Labels
To the best of our knowledge, most existing approaches to the robust verification
problem for a given FNN and an input reduce to some other problems, which
checks whether adversarial examples in the range that are not correctly classified
to the original label of the input exist or not. Therefore, the search space is
relatively larger. Instead of considering all the other labels in one verification,
we propose to sort labels and verify FNNs for each label in order to reduce the
search space.
A premise order of labels is that the larger that the probability of a label has,
the larger that the probability of finding an adversarial example for this label,
thus, the higher priority that the label should be verified. A na¨ıve approach for
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x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
`1
`2
`3
`4
1
-1
1
-2
1
-1
3
-2
1
[0,4]
[1,5]
[4,10]
x4 = x1 − 2x2 + 3x3
Interval: [2,32]
x4ub = x4lb = x4
x5 = −x1 + x2 − 2x3
Interval: [-23,-3]
x5ub = x5lb = 0
x6 = x1 − x2 + x3
Interval: [-1,13]
x6ub = k · x6 + b, x6lb = k · x6
where k = 13
14
, b = 13
14
`1lb = − 2714x1 + 4114x2 − 5514x3 − 1314
`1ub = − 2714x1 + 4114x2 − 5514x3
Interval: [−45,− 15
14
]
`2lb = − 67x1 − 17x2 + 87x3 − 137
`2ub = − 67x1 − 17x2 + 87x3
Interval: [− 10
7
, 79
7
]
`3lb = − 197 x1 + 127 x2 − 57x3 − 267
`3ub = − 197 x1 + 127 x2 − 57x3
Interval: [−20, 40
7
]
`4lb =
41
14
x1 − 6914x2 + 9714x3
`4ub =
41
14
x1 − 6914x2 + 9714x3 + 1314
Interval: [ 43
14
, 77]
-1
3
-1
1
1
-2
1
1
-4
2
-2
1
Fig. 3. An example of sorting target labels based on output interval
label sorting is to calculate the probabilities of all the labels of a target FNN
for the given input x, as the representative of all the possible inputs. Though
feasible, the sorting result also relies on the distance threshold , this intuitive
approach may lead to imprecise sorting result, which consequently misleads the
following-up verification.
When considering the distance threshold , it is infeasible if not impossible
to compute the probabilities of all the labels of a target FNN by enumerating
all the possible inputs x′ ∈ I that satisfies L∞(x, x′) ≤ . To address this tech-
nical challenge, we propose a novel approach by leveraging the symbolic interval
propagation and linear relaxation techniques.
Given an FNN f : I → O, for every x ∈ I and L∞ distance threshold , we
approximate the output range (i.e., output interval) of the FNN for the input x
and the distance threshold , by leveraging the symbolic interval propagation and
linear relaxation techniques. Firstly, we encode the set of all the possible inputs
x′ ∈ I such that L∞(x, x′) ≤  as an input interval. By applying the symbolic
interval propagation with the linear relaxation to handle the ReLU function, we
obtain the output interval. Finally, we can approximate the probabilities of all
the labels of all the possible inputs based on the approximated output range.
The labels except for the original label of the input x are then sorted in the
descending order of the probabilities of the labels for all the possible inputs.
Figure 3 shows an example of computing the output interval for label sorting
using symbolic interval propagation. For the node x6 whose interval is [-1,13], we
use linear relaxation to represent the upper bound x6ub and x6lb by two linear
constraints. Assume that `4 is the original label of some input. Then, `2 is the
most likely target label to which the input with some perturbation would be
classified because the upper bound of its output interval is larger than that of
the other labels except the original label `4. The input with any perturbation in
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Algorithm 1: Robustness verification of FNN guided by Target Labels
input : An FNN f , an input vector x, a distance threshold 
output: {Robust, Non-robust with an adversarial example, Unknown}
1 J := Labels(F )/{L(F (x))} // J: The list of target labels.
2 J ′:=sort(F, x, , J); // Sort the list J according to the probabilities
of the labels to which x with L∞ distance  are classified.
3 flag:=false; // to indicate the unkown case.
4 while J ′ 6= nil do
5 j := head(J ′); // The label j in J ′ with the largest probability.
6 Result:=Verifier(F, x, , j); // To invoke existing NN verifiers
7 switch Result do
8 case true do
9 J ′ := tail(J ′); // Remove the head of J ′
10 continue;
11 case false do
12 x′:=getAdvExample(F, x, , j); // get adversarial example
13 return x′ ;
14 case unkown do
15 flag:=true; // fail for the current label, try next one
16 J ′ := tail(J ′); // Remove the head of J ′
17 continue;
18 if flag then
19 return unknown; // if the tool fails for some label.
20 else
21 return robust; // If F is robust against all the labels in J ′
the range would never be classified to the label `1 because its upper bound is less
than the lower bound of the original label `4. Thus, `1 can be safely discarded
from verification, and the sorting result is `2; `3.
The key difference between our approach and the na¨ıve one is that: our ap-
proach returns an interval of probabilities for each label, while the latter returns a
concrete probability for the label. The interval of probabilities over-approximates
all the possible probabilities for all possible inputs in the input interval. In con-
trast, the concrete probability only reflects the classification result of one con-
crete input. It is known that symbolic interval propagation does not exclude
labels that may cause mispredication [52], thus the sorted list of labels produced
by our approach consists of all possible target labels and is more likely to be a
real one than the one produced by the na¨ıve approach.
3.2 Target Label-Guided Verification
The overview of our verification approach guided by the sorted labels is shown
in Algorithm 1. We first sort the labels as aforementioned (lines 1–2) and then
verify the robustness of the given neural network against the labels one by one
in J ′ w.r.t. the input x and a perturbation distance threshold  (while-loop).
10 Wan et al.
Let J ′ denote the sorted list of the labels (line 2), and j denote the head
of J ′ (line 5), the label to which some adversarial examples are most likely
misclassified (Line 5). We verify if the given FNN f is robust or not against the
label j by invoking an oracle Verifier (line 6). The oracle Verifier takes the
FNN f , the input x, the distance threshold  and the target label j as inputs,
and outputs true, false or unknown. There exist several state-of-the-art FNN
verification tools for verifying robustness, therefore, instead of developing our
own tool for verifying j-robustness, we in this work leverage existing tools to
achieve this goal. The difference is that we provide the tools with the most likely
target label j as additional information besides F , x and . If the oracle Verifier
returns true (i.e., robust), the algorithm proceeds to verify the remaining labels.
There are two possible outcomes if the FNN f is not robust against the
label j, depending on the precision of invoked verification tool Verifier. If the
tool is both sound and complete, e.g. MipVerify, it returns a real adversarial
example to falsify the robustness of the FNN f , namely, the adversarial example
is misclassified to the label j. If the tool is incomplete, e.g. DeepZ and Neurify,
it may return unknown after several iteration of refinements. In this case, we
set a flag to record this failure and skip this label. After all the labels have
been verified without returning any adversarial examples, the algorithm returns
robust if flag is not true, and unknown otherwise.
We remark that the soundness and completeness of our algorithm rely on
the oracle Verifier employed in the algorithm. We assume that the implemen-
tation of the oracle Verifier is sound, which is reasonable according to the
survey [31]. Then, our algorithm is also sound. By the definition of soundness,
if our algorithm returns robust, then the FNN F must be robust w.r.t. x and .
That is straightforward because the oracle Verifier returns true for all labels
in J ′. Likewise, we can show that our algorithm is complete if and only if the
implementation of the oracle Verifier is complete.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
4.1 Implementation
We implemented Algorithm 1 using Julia programming language [3]. To evalu-
ate its performance, we choose three recent promising DNN verification tools,
MipVerify, DeepZ and Neurify, as backend verifier to verify j-robustness for
each label j.
– MipVerify [50] formulates the robustness verification of piecewise-linear neu-
ral networks as a mixed-integer program. It improves existing Mixed Integer
Linear Programing (MILP) based approaches via a tighter formulation for
non-linearities and a novel presolve algorithm that makes full use of all in-
formation available. MipVerify is both sound and complete. However, the
underlying approach of MipVerify relies on applying linear programming per
neuron to obtain tight bounds for the MILP solver, which does not scale to
larger networks.
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– DeepZ [42] makes use of the abstract interpretation technique and uses the
abstract domain ZonoType that combines floating point polyhedra with in-
tervals, coupled with abstract transformers for common neural network func-
tions such as affine transforms, ReLU, sigmoid and tanh activation functions,
and the maxpool operator. These abstract transformers enable DeepZ to effi-
ciently handle both feed-forward and convolutional networks. In contrast to
MipVerify, DeepZ is not complete due to the abstraction of original models.
– Neurify [52] uses symbolic interval analysis and linear relaxation to compute
tighter bounds on the network outputs. Due to linear relaxation, Neurify is
not complete and may produce spurious adversarial examples. Therefore, it
introduces a directed constraint refinement to deal with spurious adversarial
examples by iteratively minimizing the errors introduced during the linear
relaxation process. However, the number of refinements can be infinite in
theory, and one has to set an upper bound or a time threshold to force
the tool terminate, without proving or disproving the robustness property.
Therefore, Neurify is neither complete in practice.
We basically treat the three tools as black boxes in our verification framework.
However, we slightly modified them so that they can accept a target label as its
an extra input, besides a neural network, an input of the neural network and an
L∞ distance threshold. They call their builtin verification algorithms to verify
the robustness against the given label instead of all the possible labels. We use
MipVerify∗, DeepZ∗, and Neurify∗ to represent the new tools extended with our
approach, respectively.
4.2 Experimental setting
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach, we compare both
the verification precision and execution time of the original tools and their cor-
responding extensions by our approach, respectively.
Benchmarks. We use the widely-tested dataset, MNIST [29], which is a dataset
of handwritten digits, in grayscale with 28 × 28 pixels. The dataset consists of
a training set of 60,000 examples, and a test set of 10,000 examples, associated
with a label from 10 classes. We selected the first 100 images from the test set
of MNIST for robustness verification.
Architectures. We use three different architectures of fully connected feed-
forward networks: 2×24 (FNN 1), 2×100 (FNN 2), and 5×100 (FNN 3), where
l× n denotes that the network has l layers and each layer consists of n neurons.
The network FNN 1 is taken from Neurify [52], and the networks FNN 2 and
the FNN 3 are taken from DeepZ [42]. All of them have been pre-trained without
adversarial training.
Experimental setup. All the experiments were conducted on a Linux server
running Ubuntu 18.04.3 with 32 cores AMD Ryzen Threadripper 3970X CPU @
3.7GHz and 128 GB of main memory. We set three hour as timeout threshold per
execution for all the experiments. For each FNN, we evaluate the performance
of the tools under different distance thresholds on the same set of inputs.
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Table 2. The verification results using MipVerify and MipVerify∗
(a) The result of FNN 1
FNN 1: 〈784,24,24,10〉, valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) MipVerify(s) MipVerify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.15 84.20 2.18 97.21 96/100 96/100
3 0.20 275.48 70.82 74.22 93/100 93/100
5 0.37 526.75 348.12 33.84 85/100 85/100
7 0.44 764.89 692.29 9.43 53/100 53/100
9 0.49 996.45 971.56 2.45 37/100 37/100
11 0.51 1217.51 1210.78 0.51 19/100 19/100
(b) The result of FNN 2
FNN 2 〈784,100,100,10〉 valid input: 98/100
 tsort(s) MipVerify(s) MipVerify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.92 1033.85 60.65 94.04 98/100 98/100
3 1.18 3400.88 1222.44 64.01 96/100 96/100
5 1.36 8301.88 7635.60 8.01 93/100 93/100
7 1.93 – – – – –
9 1.86 – – – – –
11 2.20 – – – – –
(c) The result of FNN 3
FNN 3 〈784,100,100,100,100,100,10〉 valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) MipVerify(s) MipVerify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 2.37 3802.77 2741.02 27.86 99/100 99/100
3 3.68 – – – – –
5 4.81 – – – – –
7 5.23 – – – – –
9 5.41 – – – – –
11 6.13 – – – – –
4.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our approach in terms of verification time and verification precision.
Specifically, for each tool T , we denote by T the verification time of the original
tool and T ∗ the verification time of the corresponding tool extended with our
approach. We also record the execution time for sorting all target labels and
denote it by tsort . The total time cost by the extended tools is the sum of
the verification time and sorting time. We calculate the time reduction rate by
(T −T ∗− tsort)/T . We use the form m/n to represent the verification precision,
where m is the number of inputs that are proved to be robust, and n is the
number of all the inputs. The time is measured by seconds. We will denote by
RST and RST∗ respectively the verification precision of the original tool and
our tool, and by ACC the time reduction rate.
Performance on MipVerify. Table 2 shows the verification results using MipVer-
ify and MipVerify∗ on the three neural networks. One can see that both tools
return the same verification results under different perturbation distance thresh-
olds and networks. MipVerify∗ is more efficient than MipVerify in all the cases.
There is a significant speedup when the perturbation threshold is small, e.g.,
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Table 3. The verification results using DeepZ and DeepZ∗
(a) The result of FNN 1
FNN 1 〈784,24,24,10〉 valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) DeepZ(s) DeepZ
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.15 4.01 0.49 83.80 96/100 96/100
3 0.20 3.98 1.44 58.76 90/100 90/100
5 0.37 4.04 3.11 13.61 54/100 54/100
7 0.44 4.14 4.30 -14.55 24/100 24/100
9 0.49 4.82 4.30 0.56 6/100 6/100
11 0.51 4.11 4.17 -13.86 0/100 0/100
(b) The result of FNN 2
FNN 2 〈784,100,100,10〉 valid input: 98/100
 tsort(s) DeepZ(s) DeepZ
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.92 41.29 1.92 93.10 97/100 97/100
3 1.18 42.14 15.37 60.71 89/100 89/100
5 1.36 43.12 40.52 2.88 56/100 56/100
7 1.93 44.05 43.75 -3.70 13/100 13/100
9 1.86 44.78 44.95 -4.54 2/100 2/100
11 2.20 45.56 45.76 -5.27 0/100 0/100
(c) The result of FNN 3
FNN 3 〈784,100,100,100,100,100,10〉 valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) DeepZ(s) DeepZ
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 2.37 94.69 52.52 42.03 99/100 99/100
3 3.68 102.78 92.23 6.69 81/100 81/100
5 4.81 117.45 94.58 15.37 33/100 33/100
7 5.23 127.98 104.20 14.49 3/100 3/100
9 5.41 132.84 123.96 2.61 0/100 0/100
11 6.13 137.91 121.01 7.80 0/100 0/100
 ≤ 3. It can even achieve 97% time reduction for small neural network when
 = 1. We can observe that the sorting time is almost linear with a very small
coefficient e.g., 0.04 for FNN 1 and 0.37 for FNN 3, respectively.
The reason of the acceleration is that MipVerify∗ will not spend extra time
on verifying those labels that are proved impossible to be misclassified to or
the robustness is already falsified. In our approach, we exclude such impossible
labels during sorting as described in Section 3.1. In contrast, MipVerify treats all
the classified labels except the original one with no difference and tries to find an
adversarial example within a perturbation threshold for all labels, which incurs
more time on finding solutions.
The experimental results also show that the acceleration of verification de-
creases with the increasing of perturbation distance threshold and the size of
network. This is because that the increase of perturbation distance threshold
will make more labels to be target labels to which adversarial examples exist.
In the worst case, our approach will not accelerate the verification due to the
intrinsic NP-completeness of the problem. As shown in Table 2(b) and 2(c), both
tools run out of time when  is too lager for the networks FNN 2 and FNN 3.
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Table 4. The verification results using Neurify and Neurify∗
(a) The result of FNN 1
FNN 1 〈784,24,24,10〉 valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) Neurify(s) Neurify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.15 2.72 0.37 80.48 96/100 96/100
3 0.20 11.96 3.02 73.03 93/100 93/100
5 0.37 57.04 53.45 5.64 78/100 79/100
7 0.44 73.71 64.25 12.23 44/100 49/100
9 0.49 92.90 88.38 4.33 25/100 30/100
11 0.51 86.19 68.94 19.41 8/100 10/100
(b) The result of FNN 2
FNN 1 〈784,100,100,10〉 valid input: 98/100
 tsort(s) Neurify(s) Neurify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 0.92 3.09 1.05 35.93 100/100 98/100
3 1.18 12.49 13.70 -19.23 93/100 95/100
5 1.36 56.88 61.92 -11.24 68/100 69/100
7 1.93 151.25 166.75 -11.53 35/100 36/100
9 1.86 140.95 170.09 -21.99 6/100 6/100
11 2.20 115.57 128.02 -12.69 1/100 1/100
(c) The result of FNN 3
FNN 3 〈784,100,100,100,100,100,10〉 valid input: 99/100
 tsort(s) Neurify(s) Neurify
∗(s) ACC(%) RST RST∗
1 2.37 5.42 2.73 5.89 100/100 99/100
3 3.68 52.76 47.90 2.23 87/100 89/100
5 4.81 116.79 114.04 -1.77 43/100 43/100
7 5.23 122.05 146.27 -24.13 7/100 8/100
9 5.41 131.22 146.91 -16.08 1/100 1/100
11 6.13 120.69 139.89 -20.99 0/100 0/100
Performance on DeepZ. Table 3 reports the verification results using DeepZ
and DeepZ∗. The verification results of both tools are the same. Because DeepZ
is an abstract interpretation based tool, it is not surprised that DeepZ is more
efficient than MipVerify. However, DeepZ does not preserve completeness after
introducing abstraction and therefore it may not be able to certify an input even
if the neural network is robust to it against the preset perturbation range. Our
results confirm this.
The experimental results also show that when  ≤ 5, our approach can ac-
celerate the verification and improve the time by up to 93.10% in some cases.
However, we also notice that when  becomes larger, e.g., greater than 5, the
acceleration becomes weak, and it can be even slower than the original tool.
The reason is similar to the one of MipVerify, i.e., there are more target labels
with the increasing of . It is worth mentioning that the reduced time is not
always strictly monotonic. Tables 3(b) and 3(c) consists of such cases. It would
be interesting to perform an in-depth analysis of these cases. One possible rea-
son is that verification per target label cannot reuse the intermediate results of
previous verifications. One may use incremental verification approach to solve
this problem. We retain them as future work.
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Performance on Neurify. Table 4 shows the verification results using Neurify
and Neurify∗. Different from the results of the above two sections, Neurify∗ may
produce different verification results from the original tool Neurify. For instance,
Neurify∗ finds more inputs to which FNN 1 is robust using less time than Neurify
when  ≥ 5 (cf. Table 4(a)). That is because that Neurify uses abstract and re-
finement in their verification approach, and a maximum number of refinements
is predefined to guarantee the termination. It returns unknown once it exceeds
the refinement threshold. The order of target labels determines how fast that the
tool reaches the threshold. The experimental results show that by sorting the
target labels we can reduce the possibility of reaching the refinement threshold.
Although our tool may take more verification time, some inputs whose verifica-
tion results are unknown produced by the original tool can be resolved as robust
by our tool.
It is worth mentioning that Neurify does not check whether an input can be
correctly classified before verification, and regards it as robust even if it is always
classified to an incorrect label. Such cases are excluded in our algorithm, and
therefore the number of safe inputs verified by Neurify∗ may be less than the one
verified by Neurify, as shown by the red numbers in Table 4.
5 Related Work
We discuss existing formal verification techniques for neural networks (cf. [31,23]
for survey). Neural network testing (e.g., [48,39,33,36,25,9,51,4,28,5,30,7,11] to
cite a few) are excluded, which are computationally less expensive and are able
to work with large networks, but at the cost of the provable guarantees.
Existing formal verification techniques can be broadly classified as either
complete or incomplete ones. Complete techniques are based on constraint solvers
such as SAT/SMT/MILP solving [13,13,26,49] or refinement [52]. They do not
produce false positives but have limited scalability and hardly handle neural
networks containing more than a few hundreds of hidden units. In contrast, in-
complete ones usually rely on approximation for better scalability, but they may
produce false positives. Such techniques mainly include duality [12,40,56], layer-
by-layer approximations of the adversarial polytope [57], discretizing the search
space [24], abstract interpretation [16,42,43], linear approximations [55,56], bound-
ing the local Lipschitz constant [55], or bounding the activation of the ReLU with
linear functions [55].
The complete robustness verification of ReLU-based neural network is essen-
tially a collection of linear programming problems. For a neuron with a ReLU ac-
tivation function, the function can be active or inactive, depending on the input.
Thus, every neuron is transformed into linear constraints. Consequently, the size
of linear programming problems to solve increases exponentially with the num-
ber of neurons in a network, which is obviously not scalable. Katz et al. proved
that the robustness verification problem of DNNs is NP-complete [26], which
illustrates the necessity of devising algorithmically efficient verification method.
They extended the classical simplex algorithm to solve this problem [26]. How-
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ever, the algorithm is still limited to small-scale neural networks. For example,
verifying a feed-forward network with 5 inputs, 5 outputs and 300 total hidden
neurons on a single data point can take a few hours [26]. Another solver-based
verification system is Planet [13], which resorts to satisfiability (SAT) solvers.
Although an adversarial example found by such approaches is a genuine one,
their scalability is always an obstacle which prevents them from being applied
to relatively large neural networks.
Incomplete verification techniques do not intend to solve the verification task
directly. Instead, they tune the verification problem into a classical linear pro-
gramming problem by over-approximating the adversarial polytope or the space
of outputs of a network for a region of possible inputs. For instance, [56] and [40]
transform the verification problem into a convex optimization problem using
relaxations to over-approximate the outputs of ReLU nodes. Another typical
work [16] leverages zonotopes for approximating each ReLU outputs. Dvijotham
et al. propose to transform the verification problem into an unconstrained dual
formulation using Lagrange relaxation and use gradient-descent to solve the
optimization problem [12]. Such over-approximation drastically improves the ef-
ficiency of obtaining provable adversarial accuracy results. However, incomplete
verification may produce false positives. Recently, two novel abstraction-based
frameworks for neural network verification have been proposed [14,2] which
merge several neurons into a single neuron and obtain a smaller, abstracted
neural network, while prior work abstracts the transformation of each neuron.
Our approach is orthogonal to, and can be integrated with existing neural
network verification techniques and abstraction-based frameworks, to accelerate
robustness verification. Although both the symbolic interval analysis and linear
relaxation techniques have been used in existing works, to our knowledge, they
are the first time used for ranking labels. Furthermore, our robustness verifica-
tion methodology that reduces to the verification for each target label and the
verification approach for one target label are new to some extent.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we proposed a novel, generic approach to accelerate the robustness
verification of DNNs. The novelty of our approach is threefold. First, we showed
that the overall verification problem can be reduced to the verification problem
for each target label. Second, we presented an efficient and effective approach
for ranking labels. Finally, we integrated our approach into three recent promis-
ing DNN verification tools. Experimental results showed that our approach is
effective when the perturbation distance is set in a reasonable range.
In future, we plan to investigate incremental verification approaches so that
the intermediate results of previous verifications could be reused for verifying
later labels. We also plan to verify industry-level networks using more powerful
hardware such as GPU. We believe that the improvement in efficiency makes it
possible to verify DNN-based systems which is crucial to apply to safety-critical
domains.
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